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School Boy’s Tricks: Reasonable 
Cybersecurity and the Panic of Law 
Creation 
David S. Levine* 
Information technology has revolutionized information 
storage and retrieval. The Internet and its connected devices 
have revolutionized how people and entities create, consume, and 
share information. Naturally, this same technology has also 
created an arms race between entities that want to keep secrets 
and those who want unauthorized access to them.1  U.S. industry, 
and anyone whose secrets (or private information) are outside a 
human brain, are fixed in the middle of this conflict.2 At the 
center of the problem, and the solution, is the vexing question of 
how to improve U.S. corporations’ cybersecurity. 
As a result, there is a fairly recent panic around how the 
government should address the “cybersecurity” problem.3 Within 
                                                                                                     
 * David S. Levine is an Associate Professor at Elon University School of 
Law, a Visiting Research Collaborator at Princeton’s Center for Information 
Technology Policy, and an Affiliate Scholar at Stanford Law School’s Center for 
Internet and Society. David also hosts Hearsay Culture on KZSU-FM Stanford 
(hearsayculture.com). Thanks to Merima Mustafic for her research assistance, 
Sharon Sandeen for her comments, and Emily Tichenor and the editors and 
staff of the Washington and Lee Law Review for hosting this symposium and 
their great work. All errors are my own. 
 1. See John Villasenor, Corporate Cybersecurity Realism: Managing Trade 
Secrets in a World Where Breaches Occur (Hoover Inst. Working Grp. on 
Intellectual Prop., Innovation, and Prosperity, Working Paper No. 14012, 2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2488756 (describing the 
“arms race” between trade secret owners and those who conduct cyberespionage 
attacks). Plenty of players are on both sides of the equation, particularly 
governments. 
 2. See David S. Levine & Sharon K. Sandeen, Here Come the Trade Secret 
Trolls, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 230, 233–34 (2015) (outlining the threats 
that U.S. companies face “from those who would hack into their computer 
systems, including operatives of foreign governments, organized crime 
syndicates, and various nuisance hackers and thrill-seekers”). 
 3. The United States Department of Homeland Security offers the 
following “extended definition” of “cybersecurity”:  
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the past few years, the White House has issued several reports on 
cybersecurity threats against U.S. industry emanating from the 
Chinese government.4 The Congressional Research Service (CRS), 
in a 2014 report to Congress on trade secrecy and federal 
legislative efforts to address misappropriation, underscores that 
point by noting the “growing and persistent threat” facing U.S. 
corporations from “individuals, rival companies, and foreign 
governments that seek to steal some of their most valuable 
intangible assets—their trade secrets.”5 Suggesting the breadth 
of the issue and the scope of legislative proposals, more than 
twenty bills have been introduced in the 114th Congress 
purporting to address “data-breach notification, incidents 
involving other nation-states, information sharing, law 
enforcement and cybercrime, protection of critical infrastructure 
                                                                                                     
Strategy, policy, and standards regarding the security of and 
operations in cyberspace, and encompass[ing] the full range of threat 
reduction, vulnerability reduction, deterrence, international 
engagement, incident response, resiliency, and recovery policies and 
activities, including computer network operations, information 
assurance, law enforcement, diplomacy, military, and intelligence 
missions as they relate to the security and stability of the global 
information and communications infrastructure.  
Explore Terms: A Glossary of Common Cybersecurity Terminology, NAT’L 
INITIATIVE FOR CYBERSECURITY CAREERS & STUDIES, https://niccs.us-
cert.gov/glossary (last visited Nov. 15, 2015) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 4. See generally Administration Strategy on Mitigating the Theft of U.S. 
Trade Secrets, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S. (Feb. 2013), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/admin_strategy_on_mi
tigating_the_theft_of_u.s._trade_secrets.pdf (“This strategy recognizes the 
crucial role of trade secrets in the U.S. economy and sets out a means for 
improved coordination within the U.S. government to protect them.”); BRIAN T. 
YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43714, PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS: OVERVIEW 
OF CURRENT LAW AND LEGISLATION, (2014), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R43714.pdf (“[T]he governments of China 
and Russia are particularly aggressive and capable collectors of sensitive U.S. 
economic information and technologies, and Chinese actors are the world’s most 
active and persistent perpetrators of economic espionage.” (internal citation and 
quotations omitted)). 
 5. Yeh, supra note 4, at 1. 
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(CI), workforce development, and education.”6 Many hearings on 
cybersecurity have also been held.7 
Moreover, cybersecurity reporting has become front-page 
news. Popular magazines like Consumer Reports and Bloomberg 
Businessweek have published breathless cover stories proclaiming 
that “Your Secrets Aren’t Safe,”8 and discussing “The Nasdaq 
Hack” and the reaction to it that “could destroy your faith in the 
financial system,”9 respectively. Recent cyberespionage and 
intrusions against entities ranging from the U.S. Office of 
Professional Management10 to the adultery website Ashley 
Madison,11 whose perpetrators have been hard or impossible to 
identify, have elevated both the hysteria around and the 
perceived urgency of the problem.12 
To be sure, there is a major problem in how we approach 
cybersecurity as a country, and an educated and honest debate of 
                                                                                                     
 6. RITA TEHAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43317, CYBERSECURITY: 
LEGISLATION, HEARINGS, AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH DOCUMENTS 2 (2015), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43317.pdf. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Your Secrets Aren’t Safe, CONSUMER REPORTS (May 2014), 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2014/07/your-secrets-aren-t-
safe/index.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 9. Michael Riley, How Russian Hackers Stole the Nasdaq, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (July 17, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-07-
17/how-russian-hackers-stole-the-nasdaq (last visited Nov. 21, 2015) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 10. KRISTIN FINKLEA ET. AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44111, CYBER 
INTRUSION INTO U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT: IN BRIEF, (2015), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44111.pdf. 
 11. Robert Hackett, What to Know About the Ashley Madison Hack, 
FORTUNE (Aug. 26, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/08/26/ashley-madison-hack/ 
(last visited Nov. 21, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 12. Indeed, the recent terrorist attacks by the Islamic State have been 
linked to whistleblower leaks by Edward Snowden, who gained unauthorized 
access to computer networks from within his contractor post with the National 
Security Agency. Mathew Blake, ‘Isis Are Using Snowden Leaks to Evade US 
Intelligence’: Former NSA Boss Warns Terror Group Are Exploiting Massive 
Breach of Security, DAILY MAIL (Sept. 5, 2014), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2745010/Isis-using-Snowden-leaks-
evade-US-intelligence-Former-NSA-boss-warns-terror-group-exploiting-massive-
breach-security.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2015) (“A Senate defense committee 
staffer said . . . : ‘Our lax security has provided our adversaries with a gold mine 
of information about our tactics and procedures.’”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
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policy options is undoubtedly warranted. The constant struggle to 
maintain secrets in the face of cyberespionage efforts, foreign and 
domestic, has appropriately alarmed Congress. Among many 
other proposals, a new federal trade secret law, dubbed the 
Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), has been introduced to “stop 
the hemorrhaging of jobs and revenue being lost to the theft of 
trade secrets.”13 As explained by its sponsors, “In today’s 
electronic age, trade secrets can be stolen with a few keystrokes, 
and increasingly, they are stolen at the direction of a foreign 
government or for the benefit of a foreign competitor.”14 The 
DTSA’s new private cause of action under the existing Economic 
Espionage Act (EEA)15 is said to take allegedly “much-needed 
steps to empower victims of trade secret theft to protect their 
intellectual property in federal court.”16 
Unfortunately, because the DTSA’s sponsors have framed the 
problem facing U.S. industry as one of insufficient legal recourse 
in trade secrecy, instead of lax cybersecurity measures, the DTSA 
is both over- and under-inclusive. It is under-inclusive because it 
does not directly address acts of cyberespionage, instead 
requiring proof of the existence of a trade secret as a predicate 
fact necessary to stop the bad behavior that is the reason behind 
the legislation. It is over-inclusive because, instead of focusing 
solely on cyberespionage (in trade secret parlance, “wrongful 
acquisition”), it would change trade secret doctrine with respect 
to trade secrets that were rightfully acquired.17  
                                                                                                     
 13. Press Release, Senate, House Leaders Introduce Bipartisan, Bicameral 
Bill to Protect Trade Secrets (Jul. 29, 2015), 
http://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/releases?ID=ad28f305-f73a-4529-
84ba-ad3285b09d6e [hereinafter Hatch Press Release]. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Defend Trade Secrets Act, S. 1890, 114th Cong. § 2(b) (2015). 
 16. Hatch Press Release, supra note 1313. The professors’ 2014 and 2015 
letters challenge this assertion. Professors’ Letter in Opposition to the “Defend 
Trade Secrets Act of 2014” (“DTSA of 2014”), S. 2267 (Aug. 22, 2014), 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/blogs/FINAL%20Professors%27%20Letter%20
Opposing%20Trade%20Secret%20Legislation.pdf [hereinafter 2014 Professors’ 
Letter]; Professors’ Letter in Opposition to the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015 
(S. 1890, H.R. 3326) (Nov. 4, 2015), https://s3.amazonaws.com/ftt-
uploads/2015+Professors+Letter+in+Opposition+to+DTSA+FINAL.pdf 
[hereinafter 2015 Professors’ Letter]. 
 17. See 2014 Professors’ Letter, supra note 16 (explaining in greater detail 
why the proposed act is over-inclusive); 2015 Professors’ Letter, supra note 16 
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Alas, the core problem facing U.S. industry in combating 
cyberespionage is not a lack of legal remedies,18 but an 
inadequate private defense; not a lack of recourse in U.S. courts, 
but a lack of robust private cybersecurity standards to prevent 
and detect unauthorized intrusions into computer systems and 
thefts therefrom. The DTSA’s underlying premise is therefore 
fatally flawed. In fact, the DTSA may actually put more trade 
secrets at risk of misappropriation as a result.   
Compounding the regulatory challenge, the government’s 
role in addressing cybersecurity issues in any context, trade 
secret misappropriation or otherwise, is far from clear and 
fraught with risk. Indeed, when Professor Edward Felten of 
Princeton University, now Deputy Chief Technology Officer of the 
United States, hypothetically asked in 2004 “what the 
government . . . can do about private-sector insecurity,” he 
answered that “[c]ertainly, most of the things the government can 
do would be harmful.”19 More recently, another expert has noted 
that, given cybersecurity’s extreme complexity, “government 
intervention is a delicate matter that may do more harm than 
good.”20 Thus, even though cybersecurity is now front-page news, 
                                                                                                     
(same). 
 18. Among the options are existing state trade secret law, contract law, 
common law trespass to chattels, the CFAA, and the DMCA. James Dowd et. al., 
Cyberespionage and Civil Suits, LAW360 (July 14, 2014); Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012); Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th 
1342 (2003); Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012); 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). 
 19. Ed Felten, What’s the Cybersecurity Czar’s Job?, FREEDOM TO TINKER 
(Oct. 4, 2004), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/whats-cybersecurity-
czars-job/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 20. Jeff Williams, What Government Can (And Can’t) Do About 
Cybersecurity, DARK READING (Jan. 22, 2015, 10:30 AM), 
http://www.darkreading.com/risk/what-government-can-(and-cant)-do-about-
cybersecurity/a/d-id/1318726 (last visited Nov. 23, 2015) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Professors’ Letter in Opposition to 
the “Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act” (S. 754) (Oct. 26, 2015), 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/04/technologists-oppose-cisainformation-
sharing-bills [hereinafter CISA Professors’ Letter] (advising that the CISA is not 
needed for information sharing but will cause privacy and surveillance harms); 
PAUL ROSENZWEIG, CYBER WARFARE: HOW CONFLICTS IN CYBERSPACE ARE 
CHALLENGING AMERICA AND CHANGING THE WORLD 162 (2013) (“It turns out that 
government intervention may do more harm than good–even if it might be 
theoretically warranted.”); Lawrence M. Walsh, Government Cybersecurity: 
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it should be no surprise that it has not been an issue (to date) in 
the 2016 U.S. Presidential election televised debates. As Steve 
Morgan, founder and CEO of Cybersecurity Ventures explained 
to NBC News, “It’s a complex topic. It’s like quicksand: Once 
[Presidential candidates] step into it, they’re going to sink.  They 
just aren’t equipped to talk about it.”21 
Unfortunately, in part due to the rush to act, Congress has 
often acted in the face of a lack of expertise and ignored experts’ 
warnings. For example, the Cybersecurity Information Sharing 
Act (CISA), designed to foster sharing about cybersecurity 
threats, has recently passed over the objections of dozens of 
security experts.22 These experts explained that such sharing 
already occurs and will lead to increased privacy and government 
surveillance concerns; yet, the law overwhelmingly passed 
Congress, and the President is expected to sign it into law.23 
Instead of addressing cyberespionage and cybersecurity squarely, 
Congress has solved a problem that has not been proven to exist, 
with significant potential downsides.  
This Essay argues that the DTSA, if enacted, will become 
part of that trend. It solves a problem that has not been proven to 
exist, while creating new or exacerbating existing problems and 
failing to address cyberespionage directly.24 Specifically, it argues 
                                                                                                     
What is Being Done to Fight Cybercrime?, TECH TARGET (May 1, 2014), 
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/Government-cybersecurity-What-is-being-
done-to-fight-cybercrime (last visited Nov. 23, 2015) (“Enterprises fear broad, 
prescriptive security laws because such laws could actually do more harm than 
good.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 21. Tim Starks, TPP Text Released, POLITICO (Nov. 5, 2015, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/morning-cybersecurity/2015/11/new-car-
hacking-legislation-set-to-drop-a-dispute-about-a-cisa-dispute-farenthold-cyber-
caucus-hit-back-over-asbestos-bill-complaints-211107 (last visited Nov. 23, 
2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 22. CISA Professors’ Letter, supra note 20. 
 23. Id.; Sam Thielman, Senate Passes Controversial Cybersecurity Bill 
CISA 74 to 21, GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 2015), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/27/cisa-cybersecurity-bill-senate-
vote (last visited Nov. 23, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Jason Koebler, The Senate Has Overwhelmingly Passed CISA, a 
Privacy-Killing Cybersecurity Bill, MOTHERBOARD (Oct. 27, 2015, 4:27 PM), 
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-senate-has-passed-cisa-a-privacy-killing-
cybersecurity-bill (last visited Nov. 23, 2015) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 24. 2014 Professors’ Letter, supra note 16; 2015 Professors’ Letter, supra 
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that rather than addressing the cyberespionage problem, the 
DTSA would instead provide legal justification for, and therefore 
help enshrine, the poor corporate cybersecurity practices that are 
the primary reason why trade secrets are now under such 
significant threat.   
There is a disconnect between the urgent desire for a 
legislative solution to the cyberespionage problem and the 
unfortunate reality that legislative solutions are lacking, or at 
least are exceptionally difficult to craft. Like CISA, the DTSA 
solves a problem that does not exist—a lack of legal remedies—
while failing to address and, in this case, worsening the real 
problem—a lack of robust cybersecurity. Indeed, better paths to 
the DTSA sponsors’ stated goal exist not in law, but in the 
marketplace. This Essay is intended to offer a basis for 
consideration of that better alternative.  
As explained by John Villasenor of the Brookings Institution, 
the “first” and most “obvious” way to address trade secret 
cyberespionage is for companies to take “all reasonable steps to 
minimize the ability of cyber-intruders to get into their systems 
and make off with their trade secrets.”25 This concept arises in—
although it is far from identical to—the Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act’s requirement that trade secrets must be “subject of efforts 
that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its 
secrecy” and can be lost for failure to do so.26 The DTSA 
incorporates this requirement.27 By examining the questionable 
“reasonable efforts” standard in modern trade secret law, which 
                                                                                                     
note 16; Levine & Sandeen, supra note 2. 
 25. Villasenor, supra note 1, at 2. These suggestions, it should be noted, are 
not all technological in their implementation. For example, Villasenor 
emphasizes the role of the employee, stating that “employees should 
be . . . encouraged to store and exchange trade secret information only to the 
extent necessary to do their jobs.” Id. at 19. Villasenor also makes a second core 
suggestion. Recognizing that cybersecurity will never be perfect, he recommends 
that “companies need to manage their intellectual property in light of the 
affirmative knowledge that their computer systems will sometimes be 
breached.” Id. 
 26. Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (amended 1985). 
 27. The DTSA adopts the EEA definition of a trade secret, which is derived 
from the UTSA. Trade Secret, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/trade_secret (last visited Nov. 15, 2015) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Defend Trade Secrets Act, S. 1890, 
114th Cong. § 2(b) (2015). 
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requires a trade secret owner to take unspecified and ambiguous 
reasonable efforts to maintain its trade secret,28 the DTSA’s core 
significant problem comes into stark relief.29  
To understand this issue, it is helpful to review the facts 
around, and outcome of, a fateful and famous flight that occurred 
in March 1969.30 On that day, Rolfe and Gary Christopher flew in 
public airspace over an E. I. duPont deNemours & Company 
(“DuPont”) chemical plant that was under construction in 
Texas.31 DuPont alleged that the Christophers took photographs 
of a “highly secret but unpatented process for producing 
methanol”—in other words, a classic trade secret.32 Indeed, 
chemical processes are among the most common forms of trade 
secrets.33 They took an alleged sixteen pictures and delivered 
them to a third party, who to this day remains unknown.34  
                                                                                                     
 28. See E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015–
16 (5th Cir. 1970) (“To obtain knowledge of a process without spending the time 
and money to discover it independently is improper unless the holder 
voluntarily discloses it or fails to take reasonable precautions to ensure its 
secrecy.”). See generally Defend Trade Secrets Act, S. 1890, 114th Cong. § 2(b) 
(2015); Uniform Trade Secrets Act (amended 1985), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trade%20secrets/utsa_final_85.pdf; 
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839 (2012). See also 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Full Text, Art. 18.78(1), Nov. 5, 2015 (incorporating 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) trade secret definition, which includes the “reasonable efforts” 
requirement). 
 29. This Essay is not designed to take on the full ramifications of the 
reasonable efforts standard. Rather, it is written to illustrate how the DTSA 
would not make the standard any more robust than it is now, and would rather 
send U.S. corporations the unfortunate message that the current state of 
corporate cybersecurity is acceptable, or at least not as significant a 
Congressional concern as the presumed need for a private federal cause of action 
under the EEA. 
 30. See generally Robert G. Bone, Trade Secrecy, Innovation, and the 
Requirement of Reasonable Secrecy Precautions, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF 
TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 46-76 (Rochelle C. 
Dreyfuss and Katherine J. Strandburg eds. 2011). 
 31. E.I. duPont, 431 F.2d at 1013. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Aija Leiponen & Justin Byma, If You Cannot Block, You Better 
Run: Small Firms, Cooperative Innovation, and Appropriation Strategies, 38 
RESEARCH POL’Y 1478, 1481–83 (2009) (noting that process innovations are 
usually more effectively protected with trade secrets); Wesley M. Cohen et. al., 
Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. 
Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or Not) 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working 
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Logically, DuPont sued for trade secret misappropriation, 
alleging that the Christophers used “improper means”35 in 
acquiring the photographs. As part of its argument, DuPont had 
to maintain that its efforts to maintain the secrecy of its chemical 
process were “reasonable”; a key element in the maintenance of a 
trade secret, then and now.36 Equally unremarkably, DuPont 
sought damages arising from the allegedly wrongful action, an 
injunction against further circulation of the photographs, as well 
as an order requiring the Christophers to divulge the identity of 
their employers.   
DuPont proved misappropriation, but for a primary reason 
that sheds light on the panic that has taken hold around 
cyberespionage and policymaking, a panic reflected in the DTSA.  
In explaining its holding, the court stated that DuPont had taken 
“special precautions to safeguard”37 this trade secret, even though 
it “was exposed to view from the air.”38 But what do we know of 
the actual efforts to engage in reasonable efforts to maintain the 
trade secret? We know that DuPont did not put a “roof”39 over the 
under-construction plant, and that it did not have—and did not 
need to have, under trade secret law—an “impenetrable 
fortress”40 around the highly secret trade secret. And, from this 
opinion—which has had a profound effect on trade secret law—
that is all we know. 
                                                                                                     
Paper No. 7552, 2000), http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552.pdf (“Secrecy is 
commonly the dominant mechanism, as in the chemicals industries, 
semiconductors and others.”). 
 34. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1013 (5th 
Cir. 1970).  
 35. Id. at 1014. This is also in the modern UTSA. Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act § 1 (amended 1985), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trade%20secrets/utsa_final_85.pdf. 
 36. E.I. duPont, 431 F.2d at 1015–16; see also Trade Secret, supra note 27 
(requiring under the definition of “trade secret” that the item be “the subject of 
efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy”); 
Defend Trade Secrets Act, S. 1890, 114th Cong. § 2(b) (2015) (the definition of 
“trade secret” includes that “the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures 
to keep such information secret”). 
 37. E.I. duPont, 431 F.2d at 1013. 
 38. Id. at 1016. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 1017. 
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In a conclusory fashion, the court found that DuPont’s efforts 
were reasonable. The problem, which is also reflected in how the 
DTSA proposes to address cyberespionage, is that rather than 
confront the possibility that DuPont could have done more to 
protect this valuable asset—short of an “impenetrable fortress” 
but more than seemingly nothing—the court instead focused on 
the Christophers’ spectacular improper means: 
[W]e realize that industrial espionage of the sort here 
perpetrated has become a popular sport in some segments of 
our industrial community. However, our devotion to free 
wheeling industrial competition must not force us into 
accepting the law of the jungle as the standard of morality 
expected in our commercial relations . . . . To 
require DuPont to put a roof over the unfinished plant to 
guard its secret would impose an enormous expense to prevent 
nothing more than a school boy's trick.41 
There is an obvious gulf between trade secrecy’s standard, 
reflected in DuPont, and Villasenor’s practical recommendation 
that “all reasonable steps” must be taken to prevent 
cyberespionage.42 Put into modern parlance, the court focused on 
the defendants’ tortious activities rather than what DuPont could 
have done to prevent theft of its property.  
Characterizing the Christophers as engaged in a “school boy’s 
trick” excused the fact that DuPont apparently did little to 
protect itself from a seemingly obvious, and temporary, 
vulnerability. Indeed, DuPont has been understood by the 
UTSA’s authors to stand for the proposition that “courts do not 
require that extreme and unduly expensive procedures be taken 
to protect trade secrets against flagrant industrial espionage.”43 
By following the UTSA/EEA standards in the name of trade 
secret law “uniformity,”44 the DTSA similarly excuses 
substandard cybersecurity against modern misappropriation 
threats by putting emphasis on the bad acts of U.S. industry’s 
attackers, rather than what U.S. industry should do to prevent 
that misappropriation in the first place. 
                                                                                                     
 41. Id. at 1016–17 (emphasis added). 
 42. Villasenor, supra note 1, at 2. 
 43. Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1 cmt. at 7 (amended 1985), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trade%20secrets/utsa_final_85.pdf 
 44. Hatch Press Release, supra note 13. 
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To be sure, the DuPont analysis arguably makes sense given 
the traditional reasons for the reasonable efforts obligation. 
While the purpose behind the reasonable efforts requirement in 
trade secret law is unclear,45 Robert Bone identified the two most 
prominent traditional arguments for the reasonable efforts 
requirement as evidentiary46 and notice.47 The evidentiary benefit 
identifies a trade secret owner’s reasonable efforts as indicating 
that a given trade secret has value, while the notice aspect 
focuses on assuring that the recipient of trade secrets recognizes 
the secrecy of the information itself. In those ways, the 
information that must be protected can be identified.  
 Unfortunately for U.S. industry, school boy tricks have 
become much more sophisticated and complex since DuPont. 
Obviously, few trade secrets were stored on computers in 1969, 
                                                                                                     
 45. Indeed, much of trade secrecy’s reason d’etre lacks clarity. See Robert 
G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 
86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 245–46  (1998) (“The reason we have a body of trade secret 
law with special rules is largely a matter of historical contingency.”); Mark A. 
Lemley, Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. 
REV. 311, 312 (2008) (“Trade secret law is a puzzle. Courts and scholars have 
struggled for over a century to figure out why we protect trade secrets. . . . [N]o 
one can seem to agree where trade secret law comes from or how to fit it into the 
broader framework of legal doctrine.”); Michel Risch, Why Do We Have Trade 
Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007) (“Trade secrets are curious 
anomalies in intellectual property law. They are arguably the most important 
and most litigated form of intellectual property, yet they have recently been 
called ‘parasitic’ and the leading economic analysis claims that ‘there is no law 
of trade secrets.’”); Sharon K. Sandeen, Lost in the Cloud: Information Flows 
and the Implications of Cloud Computing for Trade Secret Protection, 19 VA. J.L. 
& TECH. 1, 38–41 (2014) (providing an outline of trade secret law’s history, 
particularly the ambiguity of the “reasonable efforts” requirement). 
 46. See Bone, supra note 30, at 59 (citing Judge Posner for the proposition 
that “precautions can support a finding of misappropriation because they make 
lawful acquisition more difficult, and can also support an inference of 
substantial value because an owner would not invest to protect a secret with 
little value”). 
 47. See id. (“Informing third parties that the owner wishes to preserve 
secrecy.”); see also Sandeen, supra note 45, at 42–47 (explaining the reasonable 
efforts requirement and its notice function); Lemley, supra note 45, at 348–49 
(“[I]t may be that efforts to protect secrecy serve to put potential defendants on 
notice of the claim of secrecy, and therefore prevent inadvertent 
misappropriation.”); Trygve Meade, Indecision: The Need to Reform the 
Reasonable Secrecy Precautions Requirement Under Trade Secret Law, 37 S. ILL. 
U. L.J. 717, 724–25 (2013) (outlining the inconsistent application of and 
reasoning behind the reasonable secrecy precautions requirement). 
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and the Internet as we know it did not exist.48 The CRS’s report 
to Congress is framed around technology’s developing threat to 
trade secret protection:  
The tools, tactics, and methods used by [those who seek to 
steal trade secrets] vary widely but increasingly have involved 
the use of cyberspace and sophisticated technologies that 
“mak[e] it possible for malicious actors, whether they are 
corrupted insiders or foreign intelligence services (FIS), to 
quickly steal and transfer massive quantities of data while 
remaining anonymous and hard to detect.”49  
Thus, there is a modern price for DuPont and the UTSA’s 
deferential posture in the face of “school boy tricks,” namely, that 
trade secrecy’s “reasonable efforts” flexibility downplays the real 
need for robust and dynamic cybersecurity measures to address 
the ever-changing challenges to trade secret protection.50  
We should expect the DTSA to exacerbate this problem. 
Many trade secret owners, faced with the choice of improving 
their reasonable efforts to maintain their secrets or suing under 
the DTSA, will likely choose the latter. Bone explains why this 
should be expected in his discussion about the ability of the 
reasonable efforts standard to reduce enforcement “process costs”: 
The key to understanding the process cost argument is to 
recognize that precautions and litigation are substitute 
methods for protecting a secret. A rational firm with recourse 
to a trade secret claim will use precautions to protect its secret 
up to the point where the marginal cost of additional 
                                                                                                     
 48. See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Rethinking “Reasonable Efforts” to Protect 
Trade Secrets in a Digital World 23–27 (Sept. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=elizabeth_ro
we (noting that the Internet has made trade secrets more vulnerable). 
 49. Yeh, supra note 4, at 1 (quoting Office of the National 
Counterintelligence Executive, Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Secrets in 
Cyberspace, October 2011, at i, 
http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/). 
 50. Security expert Bruce Schneier also notes that unlike most commercial 
information that loses value quickly, trade secrets require long-term protection. 
BRUCE SCHNEIER, SECRETS & LIES: DIGITAL SECURITY IN A NETWORKED WORLD 61 
(2000). Thus, the need for robust cybersecurity in the face of ever-changing 
cyberintrusion methods and tactics is even more pronounced. See generally 
Rowe, supra note 48 (arguing “that the changing circumstances that have come 
about as a result of new technology requires a reexamination of what security 
measures are reasonable”). 
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precaution just exceeds the marginal cost of a trade secret 
lawsuit and then switch to litigation beyond that point. The 
problem, of course, is that not all these costs are 
internalized. . . . Under these circumstances, a rational firm 
will over-utilize litigation and underutilize precautions 
because it does not have to pay the full expense of the 
litigation alternative, including the defendant’s litigation costs 
and the relevant portion of the public subsidy.51 
Thus, a likely DTSA result will be more lost trade secrets that 
result in litigation, rather than less trade secret loss from 
improved cybersecurity in the first instance. Ironically, this is 
precisely what the DTSA’s sponsors are trying to avoid. 
By introducing the DTSA, Congress is effectively treating 
U.S. industry the same way that the Court treated DuPont: as 
the victim of a tort, a sneaky “school boy’s trick” worthy of 
condemnation, rather than a party with responsibility for 
protecting its property but nonetheless allowing the “school boy’s 
trick” to cause it such harm. Moreover, by creating a new private 
trade secret cause of action, Congress is encouraging investment 
in litigation when investment in better cybersecurity is most 
needed. While cybersecurity investment across affected industries 
is expected to increase significantly over the next several years,52 
diversion of limited resources could be the difference between a 
successful cyberintrusion versus one that is contained or avoided.  
This misplaced priority seems to extend to the Department of 
Justice, if the recently unsealed criminal complaint in United 
States v. Zeng53 is any indication. Zeng is a criminal action for 
trade secret misappropriation under the Electronic Espionage 
                                                                                                     
 51. Bone, supra note 30, at 67–68. See also David D. Friedman, William 
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 61, 68 (1991) (“Even if there is no law against theft of trade 
secrets, there is plenty a firm can do to reduce the probability of such thefts 
(screening employees more carefully, installing more effective security systems, 
and so forth); it will do less if the threat of legal sanctions deters.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 52. See Cyber Security Investing Grows, Resilient to Market Turmoil, 
REUTERS (Sept. 23, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/09/23/cyber-security-
investing/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2015) (“[W]orldwide spending on information 
security technology is expected to grow from about $77 billion this year to $108 
billion in 2019 . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 53. No. 3-15-71060 (N.D. Calif. Aug. 20, 2015). 
336 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 323 (2015) 
Act.54 The defendant, Jing Zeng, was an employee of Machine 
Zone, Inc., developer of the Internet videogame “Game of War.”55 
According to the complaint, on July 8, 2015, Zeng was informed 
by Machine Zone that he would be “exiting” the company.56  
What happened after that date underscores Machine Zone’s 
arguable lack of reasonable efforts taken to protect its alleged 
trade secrets. After that date, Zeng repeatedly downloaded 
alleged trade secrets for which he had “no business reason.”57 
After a July 10 meeting with Machine Zone senior employees 
where Zeng noted that his termination was “unfair” and “made 
statements . . . interpreted as threatening to the company,”58 he 
was allowed to leave Machine Zone’s office with his company 
laptop.59  
Zeng later admitted that he had “downloaded files from the 
company-issued laptop, backed up the files to a USB drive or a 
larger portable external hard drive, and later wiped [i.e., erased] 
the laptop during a drunken moment.”60 Indeed, Zeng apparently 
copied “certain Machine Zone files and documents onto his laptop 
from an external device” at 10:00 AM on July 15.61 He returned 
the company laptop to Machine Zone thirty minutes later—five 
days after he had threatened Machine Zone and one day after he 
was asked to return the laptop.62 Some of the storage devices 
wound up in China, prompting the criminal complaint.63 
                                                                                                     
 54. Complaint ¶ 1, United States v. Zeng, No. 3-15-71060 (N.D. Calif. Aug. 
20, 2015). It should be noted that a stated justification for the EEA is that the 
Department of Justice lacks the resources to bring EEA actions, so the private 
sector must be empowered to vindicate these rights. Hatch Press Release, supra 
note 13. While it is one case, the Zeng prosecution suggests that further study is 
warranted to provide evidence for this assertion.  
 55. Complaint ¶ 2, United States v. Zeng, No. 3-15-71060 (N.D. Calif. Aug. 
20, 2015). 
 56. Id. ¶ 28. 
 57. Id. ¶¶ 28–31, 41. 
 58. Id. ¶ 32. 
 59. Id. ¶ 34. His access to Machine Zone’s computer system was apparently 
shut off at 4:00 PM that day. Id. 
 60. Id. ¶ 52. 
 61. Id. ¶ 39. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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Machine Zone’s actions arguably fail the “reasonable efforts” 
standard. Far from being a cyberintrusion from the outside, 
Machine Zone was primarily victimized in trade secrecy’s typical 
way, from within. By failing to exercise basic common sense, like 
not allowing a threatening employee access to trade secrets and 
letting him leave Machine Zone’s offices with a company laptop 
after he had made such threats, Machine Zone allowed its trade 
secrets to be compromised.64 Zeng’s seeming obliviousness to 
Machine Zone’s cybersecurity shortcomings underscores the need 
to consider the potential palliative effects of criminal 
prosecutions—and a new private federal cause of action—on 
current lackluster cybersecurity practices and standards. The 
simple fact is that Machine Zone had the power and ability to 
engage in self-help efforts, but failed to do so.   
To be sure, not all courts are sympathetic to trade secret 
owners who fail to meet the minimal reasonable efforts burden in 
existing trade secret law. Robert Bone explained a few of these 
cases: 
One court explained that a trade secret owner who “disregards 
caution” is denied relief “on the theory that he courted his own 
disaster,” perhaps suggesting an assumption of risk rationale. 
Another drew a connection to the clean hands doctrine in 
equity: “To put it another way, the employer must come into 
court with clean hands; the employer cannot complain of the 
employee’s use of information if the employer has never 
treated the information as secret.” And yet another court 
simply asserted without additional argument, but perhaps 
with the idea in mind that self-help might be less costly than 
litigation, that “it would be anomalous for the courts to 
prohibit the use of information that the rightful owner did not 
undertake to protect.”65 
                                                                                                     
 64. See, e.g., Protecting Trade Secrets When Employees Depart, LAW360 
(Sept. 18, 2009, 11:16 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/116377/protecting-
trade-secrets-when-employees-depart (last visited Nov. 23, 2015) (“Once the 
employer is aware that an employee is leaving, steps should be put in place to 
limit or eliminate that employee’s access to the company’s trade secrets and 
confidential information. This might include changing passwords, requiring the 
return of laptop computers and handheld devices, and eliminating remote 
access.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 65. Bone, supra note 30, at 60–61 (quoting RTE Corp. v. Coatings, Inc., 267 
N.W.2d 226, 233 (Wis. 1978); Electro-Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 
N.W.2d 890, 901 (Minn. 1983); Dicks v. Jensen, 172 Vt. 43, 50 (2001)). 
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More recently, some courts have taken notice of poor 
cybersecurity as a basis to deny trade secret protection because of 
a failure to exercise reasonable efforts.66 Nonetheless, the DTSA’s 
focus on litigation against bad actors obscures the fact that 
reasonable efforts to maintain trade secrets are the first line of 
defense against misappropriation, not the second. 
Perhaps it is time for Congress to focus more on the question 
of what responsibility U.S. industry has to engage in self-help, 
and less on the tricks that it has to ignominiously face. It may be 
time to take “reasonable efforts” more seriously, or redefine its 
meaning in a cybersecurity context.67 Perhaps we should consider 
adopting a more robust and specific “reasonable cybersecurity” 
                                                                                                     
 66. See Wayman Fire Protection, Inc. v. Premium Fire & Security, LLC, 
No. 7866-VCP, 2014 WL 897223, at *16 (Del. Ch. Mar. 5, 2014) (finding that 
simply relying on primarily a password requirement was insufficient to show 
reasonable efforts); Diamond Power Int’l, Inc. v. Davidson, 540 F. Supp. 2d 
1322, 1334–35 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (finding a lack of reasonable efforts to maintain 
secrecy where plaintiff failed to show that it labeled the file confidential or 
otherwise communicated the confidentiality of the file to its employees, directed 
its employees to maintain the secrecy of the file, or tracked or otherwise 
regulated the use of the file); Boston Laser, Inc. v. Zu, No. 3:07-CV-0791, 2007 
WL 2973663, at *10, *12 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2007) (finding that the plaintiff 
had not taken reasonable measures to preserve secrecy where, among other 
things, “the computer network on which such matters are digitally stored is 
generally not even password protected beyond the log-in process”); PatientPoint 
Network Solutions, LLC v. Contextmedia, Inc., No. 1:14-CV-226, 2014 WL 
1152940, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 21, 2014) (finding that the plaintiff’s failure to 
make a written demand for the return of employee’s company-issued laptop and 
iPad upon termination, the plaintiff’s failure to request that the employee 
return other purportedly proprietary and trade secret information, and the 
plaintiff’s waiting six months after it discharged the former employee before 
making a written demand for the return of these items and information did not 
amount to reasonable efforts). 
 67. While beyond the scope of this Article, Villasenor has identified five 
recommendations for improved cybersecurity to protect trade secrets: (1) 
Companies Should Segment Their Networks and the Trade Secret Information 
on Those Networks; (2) Companies Should Avoid Overreliance on NDAs on 
Mechanisms to Protect Trade Secrets Because Over-Disclosure Can Lead to 
Increased Exposure to Cyber-Enabled Trade Secret Theft; (3) Companies Should 
Act More Quickly on Patentable Inventions; (4) Companies Should Ensure That 
Cybersecurity Considerations Are Part of Their Patent and Trade Secret 
Decisions; (5) For Inventions Retained as Trade Secrets, Early Commercial Use 
Can Provide Important Protection if the Trade Secret is Later Patented by a 
Third Party. Villasenor, supra note 1; see also Rowe, supra note 48, at 15–28 
(explaining how technological advances can increase challenges to companies’ 
data security and trade secret protection). 
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standard rather than “reasonable measures” in the abstract, or 
tailor it to particular types of threats.  
Importantly, this article does not argue for a more robust 
codified reasonable efforts standard per se, but rather highlights 
the importance of applying the existing requirement 
appropriately to ensure that U.S. trade secret owners take 
responsibility for their own cybersecurity. There are potential 
downsides to a more rigorous application of the reasonable efforts 
requirement, including the potential for less diffusion of 
information and some bad actors walking away from bad acts.68 
But these concerns should be weighed against the costs to be 
incurred if the reasonable efforts requirement is effectively 
ignored because the defendant’s activities are deemed to be 
egregious. Those issues are worthy of deeper analysis than can be 
considered in this article. But that’s the point: The fact that this 
issue requires much more analysis and thought underscores the 
need to reject the DTSA.69  
Especially given the lack of understanding and empirical 
evidence as to the potential impact of a massive change in U.S. 
trade secret law, the DTSA should be abandoned.70 The DTSA 
has not been thoroughly vetted, and its potential to create worse 
                                                                                                     
 68. See Bone, supra note 30, at 21 (“[R]estricts diffusion by encouraging 
trade secret owners to bolster their self-help measures.”); see also Lemley, supra 
note 45, at 348–49 (noting potential negative effects that could stem from 
heightened reasonable efforts requirements). See generally David S. Levine, 
Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our Public Infrastructure, 59 
FLA. L. REV. 135 (2007) (explaining how the aims of secrecy sometimes conflict 
with “the methods and purpose of transparent and accountable democratic 
governance”). 
 69. See Hatch Press Release, supra note 13 (admitting the complexities of 
trade secret law in light of endless technological advancements). The fact of 
uniformity is also in dispute. See 2014 Professors’ Letters, supra note 16 
(arguing that “[t]he Acts will damage trade secret law and jurisprudence by 
weakening uniformity while simultaneously creating parallel, redundant and/or 
damaging law”); 2015 Professors’ Letters, supra note 16 (same). 
 70. As a general matter, trade secret law suffers from a severe lack of 
empirical research. See David Almeling et. al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade 
Secret Litigation in Federal Courts, 45 GONZAGA L. REV 291, 295 (2009/2010) (“In 
contrast to patents, trademarks and copyrights, little statistical analysis exists 
on either trade secrets or trade secret litigation. For trade secrets, the 
explanation is simple - because trade secrets must be kept secret to qualify for 
protection, there is little publicly available material to study.”) Thus, the DTSA 
is a massive and very risky experiment with little relevant evidence to support 
it. 
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conditions for U.S. industry is real. We must reconsider whether 
we want to treat today’s sophisticated foreign cyberespionage the 
same way as we have treated yesterday’s “school boy’s trick.” Due 
to the fact that trade secrets cease to exist once they are publicly 
disclosed, it is better that trade secret information never be 
wrongful acquired, disclosed, or used in the first place. Therefore, 
U.S. industry would do well to focus its efforts on improved 
cybersecurity to prevent or contain trade secret losses, rather 
than litigation around the damage arising from its loss.  
 
